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While, as noted, in most cases, the indicators did their task well and signaled ahead of 
crises, Indonesia, which has witnessed a meltdown in its currency and a collapse in its banking 
industry is firmly anchored at the bottom of the list presented in Table 5.5, as relatively few 
indicators gave advanced warning. True, the few signals that were coming were from the more 
reliable indicators, yet using this approach it would not have been labeled “vulnerable.”  In a 
similar vein, some of the countries that appear near the top of the list in terms of vulnerability are 
not the countries that have typically been buffeted by financial markets in the wake of bad news 
elsewhere.  Following the crises in Mexico and Thailand, Argentina and Brazil were at the top of 
the “hit list” of financial markets--yet, particularly in the case of Argentina, this would be 
difficult to justify strictly on the basis of the fundamentals reviewed here. 
Perhaps South Africa is in for a financial crisis in the near future (it has already been 
subject to some speculative attacks); perhaps it can muddle through with less-than-pristine 
fundamentals if they are not the usual targets of contagion.  On the basis of the analysis 
presented here, it would appear that Indonesia, poor banking practices notwithstanding, was 
brought down by contagion.  Of the 89 currency crises and nearly 30 banking crises, only a 
handful occur with as few indicators (22 percent) flashing as was the case for Indonesia.  As 
noted in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), economies tend to be “frail” in the eve of a crisis.  As 
shown in Table 6.7, less than 15 percent of the currency and banking crises shared the 
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Indonesian characteristic of the silence of signals. 
 Table 6.1 On contagion: the dogs that did not bark 
 
 
Type of crisis and 
sample 
 
Number of crises 
 
Number of crises 
that occurred with 
five or less indicators 
signaling 
 
Proportion of crises that 
occurred with five or less 
indicators signaling 
 
Banking, 1970-95 
 
29 
 
  3 
 
10.3 
 
Currency, 1970-95 
 
87 
 
12 
 
13.5 
 
Banking, 1996-1997 
 
 6 
 
1 
 
16.7 
 
Currency, 1996-1997 
 
 6 
 
1 
 
16.7 
 
 
The empirical evidence on contagion is still limited to a few papers, but the weight of the 
empirical results appears to suggest it important.  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) 
examine the issue in the context of OECD countries.  They find that knowing that there is a crisis 
elsewhere significantly increases the probability of a domestic crisis--even after controlling for 
domestic and external fundamentals.  As in Glick and Rose (1998), they point to trade links as 
the channel that is a culprit for the transmission of disease.  The evidence in Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996) suggests that cross border capital flows have a “contagious” element, at least in Latin 
America.  Schmukler and Frankel (1996) find evidence of contagion in emerging market funds.  
Doukas (1988) found evidence of contagion in sovereign interest rate spreads.  Indeed, one of the 
very few empirical studies that does not find evidence of contagion (or in this case, “excess 
comovement” in equity returns) is Wolf (1997). 
In any case, to the extent that contagion is a force that is at play in international financial 
markets, being near the bottom of the “vulnerability” list does not preclude a country from 
having a crisis, as the Indonesian collapse and the recurring bouts of speculation against the 
Argentinean peso highlight.  In what follows, we review briefly some of the theoretical 
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underpinnings for contagion and then move on to assess to what extent crises probabilities 
increased for other emerging markets following the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Asian crisis 
of 1997. 
 
Explaining Contagion: Theoretical Underpinnings 
Most of the theoretical work on contagion has attempted to provide a framework that 
allows us to understand how shocks in one country are transmitted elsewhere.  Our review of this 
literature emphasizes its empirical implications in terms of defining contagion, delineating its 
channels of influence, and testing for its presence.  
Defining contagion: In the only paper (that we are aware of) that examined the issue of 
contagion in the context of Latin America’s debt crisis (Doukas, 1989), contagion was seen as 
the influence of “news” about the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower on the spreads 
charged to the other sovereign borrowers, after controlling for country-specific macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  Other studies, such as Valdes (1995), defined contagion somewhat differently--as 
excess comovement across countries in asset returns, whether debt or equity.  The comovement 
is said to be excessive if it persists even after common fundamentals, as well as idiosyncratic 
factors, have been controlled for.  A recent variant to this approach is presented in Rigobon 
(1998) and Forbes and Rigobon (1998), who define contagion more narrowly by requiring an 
increase in excess comovement in crisis periods. 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz  (1996) defined contagion as a case where knowing that 
there is a crisis elsewhere increases the probability of a crisis at home, even when fundamentals 
have been properly taken into account.  This is the definition of contagion that we will explore in 
the remainder of this chapter. 
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 Theories of contagion and their empirical implications: To explain why crises tend to be 
bunched, some recent models have revived Nurkse’s story of competitive devaluations, which 
emphasized trade, be it bilateral or with a third party.1  Once one country has devalued, it makes 
it costly (in terms of a loss of competitiveness and output) for other countries to maintain their 
parity.  In this setting the devaluation in the second country is a policy decision and its effect on 
output is salutary.  Hence, an empirical implication of this type of  model is that we should 
observe a high volume of trade among the “synchronized” devaluers.2  
                     
     
1See Smets and Gerlach (1996) for a model that emphasizes bilateral trade and Corsetti 
et. al. (1998) for one in which emerging markets compete in a common third market. 
     
2As a story of fundamentals-based contagion, of course, this explanation does not speak 
to the fact that central banks often go to great lengths to avoid the devaluation in the first place. 
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Another family of models has de-emphasized the role of trade in goods and services and 
stressed the role of trade in financial assets, particularly in the presence of information 
asymmetries.  Calvo and Mendoza (1998) present a model where the fixed costs gathering and 
processing country-specific information give rise to herding behavior, even when investors are 
rational.  Kodres and Pritsker (1998) also present a model with rational agents and information 
asymmetries.  However, they stress the role played by investors who engage in cross-market 
hedging of macroeconomic risks.  In either case, these models suggest that the channels of 
transmission come from the global diversification of financial portfolios.  As such, they have the 
empirical implication that countries with have more internationally-traded financial assets and 
more liquid markets are likely to be more vulnerable to contagion.  Small, highly illiquid markets 
are likely to be under represented in international portfolios to begin with and, as such, shielded 
from this type of contagion.  In addition, cross-market hedging usually requires a moderately 
high correlation of asset returns.  The implication is that countries whose asset returns exhibit a 
high degree of comovement with the infected country (such as Argentina with Mexico or 
Malaysia with Thailand) will be more vulnerable to contagion via the cross-market hedges that 
were in place as the crisis erupted. 
In addition to these explanations of contagion, Calvo (1998) has stressed the role of 
liquidity.  A leveraged investor facing margin calls needs to sell (to an uninformed counterpart) 
his or her asset holdings.  Because of the information asymmetries, a “lemons problem” arises 
and the asset can only be sold  at a firesale price.  
A variant of this story can be told about an open-end fund portfolio manager who needs 
to raise liquidity in anticipation of future redemptions.  In either case, the strategy will be not to 
sell the asset whose price has already collapsed but other assets in the portfolio.  In doing so, 
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however, other asset prices are depressed and the original disturbance spreads across markets. 
One potential channel of transmission that has been largely ignored in the contagion 
literature but that is stressed in this paper is the role of common lenders, in particular commercial 
banks.  U.S. banks had an extensive exposure to Latin America in the early 1980s, much in the 
way that Japanese banks did during the Asian crisis of 1997.  The behavior of foreign banks can 
both exacerbate the original crisis, by calling loans and drying up credit lines, but can also 
propagate crises by calling loans elsewhere.  The need to rebalance the overall risk of the bank’s 
asset portfolio and to recapitalize following the initial losses can lead to a marked reversal in 
commercial bank credit across markets where the bank has exposure. 
 
Very few studies have gone beyond establishing that there is contagion or spillovers and 
attempted to assess the underlying causes.  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) attempted to 
discriminate whether bilateral trade links or similarities to the crisis country in  macroeconomic 
fundamentals, which may lead investors to reassess the risk of the others.  Glick and Rose (1998) 
examined these issues further in a much broader country coverage, while Wolf (1997) attempted 
to explain the pairwise correlations in stock returns by bilateral trade and other common 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  All studies conclude that trade linkages play an important role in 
the propagation of shocks.  Because trade tends to be more intra- than inter-regional in nature, 
Glick and Rose (1998) conclude that this helps explain why contagion tends to be regional rather 
than global.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998b), also look at trade links--both bilateral and third-
party--but that paper emphasized financial sector links. The remainder of this chapter is devoted 
to addressing some of  these issues for the Tequila crisis and the Asian flu. 
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Contagion in the Mexican and Asian Crises: Some Evidence 
In this part of this chapter we turn our attention to two recent “contagious” episodes, the 
aftermath of the Mexican peso crisis and the floatation of the Thai baht.  Identifying the 
countries that were affected by the initial crisis is easy; pinning down the channels through 
which the crisis spread remains the more challenging task. 
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Table 6.2 summarizes some of the possible channels through which the crisis can 
spread.  Obviously, to the extent that there is herding behavior and investors lump all emerging 
markets, or perhaps only those in the infected region, together that adds yet another dimension 
through which the crisis spreads.  As far as the affected countries’ exchange rate arrangements 
at the outset of the crisis, these cover the range from currency board to managed float.  Of 
course, it is widely agreed that both the Philippine and Malaysian central banks intervened 
heavily in the foreign exchange market.  Hence, there was a good deal of “managing” in these 
managed floats. Nonetheless, it appears that none of these exchange rate arrangements 
succeeded in making the countries impervious to contagion. 
As regards the potential role of bilateral and third party trade linkages, Malaysia would 
be the most closely linked with Thailand, with Korea and the Philippines having more moderate 
exposure.  Trade can certainly not help explain Argentina and Brazil following the Mexican 
devaluation nor Indonesia following the Thai crisis.  Exposure to Japanese banks, which pulled 
out rapidly across the region was common to all the affected countries except Hong Kong.  
While both Brazil and Argentina are in the same U.S. bank cluster as Mexico, banks were not at 
the heart of the problem in 1994 as they were in the early 1980s.   
Most of the affected Asian countries, except Korea had high asset return correlations 
with Thailand, although none except Hong Kong had particularly liquid markets.  The same is 
true of stock returns in Argentina, which have the highest correlation with Mexico of any 
country in the region.  Here it is hard to separate cause and effect.  A high correlation may 
reflect past contagion, but to the extent that current cross-hedging strategies use such historical 
correlations as a guide, it could be the vehicle for future contagion. In sum, it would appear that 
financial sector linkages, be it through banks of through international capital markets have much 
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to say in how shocks are propagated in recent crises episodes, particularly for Argentina, Brazil, 
and Indonesia. 
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 Table 6.2 Recent episodes: Possible Channels of Transmission 
 
Affected 
countries 
 
Exchange 
rate regime 
at the onset 
of the crisis 
 
Nature of 
contagion 
or spillover 
 
Commo
n bank 
lender 
 
High 
correlation 
of returns 
 
Liquid 
market/high 
representation 
in mutual 
fund. Percent 
of emerging 
market 
portfolio. 
 
Bilateral trade: 
Percent of 
exports to 
affected 
country 
 
Trade with 
common third 
party in same 
commodities: 
Percent of 
exports 
competing 
with  top 
exports of 
affected 
country 
 
Tequila crisis: 1994-95                     First crisis: Mexico, December 1994 
 
Argentina 
 
Currency 
board 
 
turbulence 
 
Yes 
 
High, 0.56 
 
Moderate, 2.98 
 
Low, 1.7 
 
Low, 15.6 
 
Brazil 
 
Peg 
 
turbulence 
 
Yes 
 
Moderate, 
0.36 
 
High, 13.07 
 
Low, 2.4 
 
Low, 10.9 
 
Asian flu: 1997-1998                       First crisis: Thailand, July 1997 
 
Malaysia, 
July 
 
Managed 
float 
 
crisis 
 
Yes 
 
High, 0.60 
 
Moderate, 5.88 
 
Moderate, 4.1 
 
High, 44.4 
 
Philippines, 
July 
 
Managed 
float 
 
crisis 
 
Yes 
 
High, 0.68 
 
Low, 2.40 
 
Moderate, 3.8 
 
Low, 19.2 
 
Indonesia, 
August 
 
Narrow 
band 
 
crisis 
 
Yes 
 
High, 0.54 
 
Moderate, 4.35 
 
Low, 1.8 
 
Low, 15.5 
 
Hong Kong, 
October 
 
Currency 
board 
 
turbulence 
 
No 
 
 
 
High, 15.33 
 
Low, 1.0 
 
Low 
 
Korea, 
November 
 
Crawling 
band 
 
crisis 
 
Yes 
 
Low, 0.24 
 
Moderate, 6.16 
 
Low, 2.0 
 
Moderate, 27.9 
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 APPENDIX A: DATA AND DEFINITIONS 
Crisis index: The index is a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve changes, with 
weights such that the two components of the index have equal conditional volatilities.  Since 
changes in the exchange rate enter with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a 
negative weight attached, readings of this index that were three standard deviations or more 
above the mean were cataloged as crises.  For countries in the sample that had hyperinflation, 
the construction of the index was modified.  While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic 
for a country with low-to-moderate inflation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace 
during hyperinflations.  A single index for the countries that had hyperinflation episodes would 
miss sizable devaluations and reserve losses in the moderate inflation periods, since the historic 
mean is distorted by the high-inflation episode.  To avoid this, we divided the sample according 
to whether inflation in the previous six months was higher than 150 percent and then 
constructed an index for each subsample.  Our cataloging of crises for these countries coincides 
fairly tightly with our chronology of currency market disruptions. Eichengreen, Rose, and 
Wyplosz (1995) also include interest rates in this index, however, our data on 
market-determined interest rates for developing countries does not span the entire sample. 
The indicators: 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund; Emerging 
Market Indicators, International Finance Corporation (IFC); World Development Indicators, the 
World Bank, when data was missing from these sources, central bank bulletins and other 
country-specific sources were used as supplements.  Unless otherwise noted, we used 12-month 
percent changes. 
1. M2 multiplier: The ratio of M2 to base money, (IFS lines 34 plus 35) divided by IFS line 14. 
  21 
2.  Domestic credit/nominal GDP: IFS line 52 divided by  IFS line 99b (interpolated).  Monthly 
nominal GDP was interpolated from annual or quarterly data.  
3.  Real interest rates on deposits: IFS line 60l, monthly rates, deflated using consumer prices 
(IFS line 64) expressed in percentage points.  
4. The ratio of lending rates to deposit rates: IFS line 60p divided by  IFS line60l; was used in 
lieu of differentials to ameliorate the distortions caused by the large percentage point spreads 
observed during high inflation.  In levels. 
  5.  “Excess” real balances: M1 (IFS line34) deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64) less an 
estimated demand for money.  The demand for real balances is determined by real GDP 
(interpolated IFS line99b), domestic consumer price inflation, and a time trend.  Domestic 
inflation was used in lieu of nominal interest rates, as market-determined interest rates were not 
available during the entire sample for a number of countries; the time trend (which can enter 
log-linearly, linearly, or exponentially) is motivated by its role as a proxy for financial 
innovation and/or currency substitution.  Excess money supply (demand) during pre-crisis 
periods (mc) is reported as a percent relative to excess supply (demand) during tranquil times 
(mt)--that is, 100 x (mc-mt)/mt. 
6.  M2 (in US dollars)/reserves (in US dollars): IFS lines 34 plus 35 converted into dollars 
(using IFS line ae) divided by  IFS line 1L.d. 
7.  Bank deposits: IFS line 24 plus 25.  
8.  Exports (in US dollars): IFS line 70. 
9.  Imports (in US dollars): IFS line 71. 
10. The terms of trade: the unit value of exports (IFS line 74) over the unit value of imports 
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(IFS line 75).  For those developing countries where import unit values (or import price indices) 
were not available, an index of prices of manufactured exports from industrial countries to 
developing countries was used. 
11.  The real exchange rate: This measure used is based on consumer price indexes (IFS lines 
64) and is defined as the relative price of foreign goods (in domestic currency) to the price of 
domestic goods.  If the central bank of the home country pegs the currency to the dollar 
(Deutsche mark), the relevant foreign price index is that of the United States (Germany). Hence, 
for all the European countries the foreign price index is that of Germany while for all the other 
countries, consumer prices in the United States were used. The trend was specified as, 
alternatively, log-linear, linear, and exponential; the best fit among these was selected on a 
country-by-country basis.  Deviations from trend during crisis periods (dc) were compared to 
the deviations during tranquil times (dt) and are shown in Figures 2 and 3 as a percent of the 
deviations in tranquil times (i.e.,100 x (dc-dt)/dt). 
12.  Reserves: IFS line 1L.d. 
13.  Domestic-foreign interest rate differential on deposits: Monthly rates in percentage 
points. IFS lines 60l. Interest rates in the home country are compared with interest rates in the 
United States (Germany) if the domestic central bank pegs the currency to the dollar (Deutsche 
mark).  The real interest rate is given by 100 x [((1+ it)pt /pt+1-1]. 
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14.  Output: For most countries, the measure of output used is industrial production (IFS 
line 66).  However, for some countries (the commodity exporters) an index of output of 
primary commodities is used (IFS lines 66aa). 
15: Stock returns (in dollars): IFC global indices are used for all emerging markets; for 
industrial countries the quotes from the main bourses are used.  
16.  Overall budget balance/GDP: Consolidated public sector balance as share of 
nominal GD 
